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Abstract
Although mixed extensions of finite games always admit equilibria, this
is not the case for countable games, the best-known example being Wald’s
pick-the-larger-integer game. Several authors have provided conditions for the
existence of equilibria in infinite games. These conditions are typically of topo-
logical nature and are rarely applicable to countable games. Here we establish
an existence result for the equilibrium of countable games when the strategy
sets are a countable group and the payoffs are functions of the group operation.
In order to obtain the existence of equilibria, finitely additive mixed strategies
have to be allowed. This creates a problem of selection of a product measure of
mixed strategies. We propose a family of such selections and prove existence of
an equilibrium that does not depend on the selection. As a byproduct we show
∗Supported by Swiss SNF Sinergia project CRSI22-130435
that if finitely additive mixed strategies are allowed, then Wald’s game admits
an equilibrium. We also prove existence of equilibria for nontrivial extensions of
matching-pennies and rock-scissors-paper. Finally we extend the main results
to uncountable games.
Keywords and phrases: Amenable groups, infinite games, existence of equilibria,
invariant means, Wald’s game.
MSC 2000 subject classification: Primary 91A06, 91A10; secondary 43A07.
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1 Introduction
In his celebrated theorem Nash (1950, 1951) used fixed point theorems to prove
that any finite game admits an equilibrium in mixed strategies. The result fails in
general if the strategy sets are not finite. Several authors have provided conditions
under which even infinite games admit an equilibrium. Among them Debreu (1952),
who assumed convexity and compactness of the strategy sets and continuity and
quasi-concavity of the payoffs, and Glicksberg (1952), who assumed compactness of
the strategy sets and continuity of the payoff functions. The same year Fan (1952)
extended Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, this way permitting a generalization of
Nash’s existence theorem like the one in Glicksberg (1952).
One stream of literature considered existence theorems under various conditions
that allow discontinuous payoff functions: see, e.g. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986),
Simon (1987), Simon and Zame (1990), Reny (1999), Carmona (2005, 2010), Barelli and Soza
(2010), Barelli, Govindan, and Wilson (2012), Bich and Laraki (2012), papers in Carmona
(2011), and references therein.
Wald (1945) considered the case where the strategy set of either one or both
players is countable and showed that the mixed extension of a game has a value if
one of the strategy sets is finite, but in general it doesn’t if they are both countable.
One way to overcome the lack of equilibria in some games is to enlarge the set
of mixed strategy by including also finitely additive probability measures. For the
probabilistic and decision-theoretical foundations of the use of finitely additive prob-
ability measures, we refer the reader to de Finetti (1970, 1972, 2008), and Savage
(1972). Dubins and Savage (1976) used finitely additive measures extensively in their
approach to gambling.
The main issue along this road is that in general a mixed extension is not well
defined. Given two measures µ1, µ2 on the power sets of S1 and S2, respectively, a
product measure µ1 ⊗ µ2 is uniquely defined only on the algebra generated by the
cylinders and can be extended in a non-unique way to the power set of S1×S2. As a
consequence, Fubini’s theorem cannot be applied to this situation and in general the
order of integration of a double integral matters.
To obviate this drawback several solutions were proposed in the framework of
zero-sum two-person games. Both Yanovskaya (1970) and Kindler (1983) defined
the expected value of the payoff to be an arbitrary fixed value, whenever Fubini’s
theorem cannot be used, and proved this way the existence of a value for the game.
Heath and Sudderth (1972) instead proved the existence of a value by selecting the
product measure that corresponds to a fixed order of integration. Schervish and Seidenfeld
(1996) used an approach, whose generalization we follow in our paper, that selects
as product measure a convex combination of the measures obtained by interchanging
the order of integration. In order to obtain the existence of a value they need the
condition that, in their words, there exist some maxmin µ1-strategy where each good
µ2-reply to µ1 is close to one of some finite collections of µ2.
Finitely additive mixed strategies have been used by Maitra and Sudderth (1993,
1998) in the framework of zero-sum stochastic games. Cotter (1991) considered
finitely additive strategies in correlated equilibria; Stinchcombe (2011) showed the
limitation of his approach and proposed an alternative one.
Marinacci (1997) proved the existence of Nash equilibria in finitely additive mixed
strategies under purely measure-theoretic conditions and connected this to the exis-
tence of ε-equilibria with countably additive mixed strategies. His analysis needs to
restrict attention to payoff functions that are measurable with respect to the algebra
generated by the cylinders.
Harris, Stinchcombe, and Zame (2005) dealt with a class of games called nearly
compact and continuous and proved existence of equilibria for any game in this class
via a continuous compact imbedding in a larger game. They showed the use and
limitations of finitely additive mixed strategies for these games.
Stinchcombe (2005) devoted his attention to games that are not nearly compact
and continuous and considered several classes of equilibria for these games showing
advantages of disadvantages for each of them. The use of finitely additive strategies
is fundamental in his analysis.
Myerson and Reny (2012) have recently proposed a new notion of equilibrium for
infinite games using finitely additive mixed strategies that arise from suitable finite
approximations.
Capraro and Morrison (2012) proved existence of equilibria for a family of zero-
sum two-person games on semigroups when feasible mixed strategies are restricted to
a suitable subclass of the class of finitely additive probability measures.
In this paper we prove an existence result for Nash equilibria of countable games
by imposing some algebraic conditions on the payoff functions. The strategy set of
each player is assumed to be a countable group and the payoff functions depend
on their arguments only through the group operation. No topological condition is
required. We allow finitely additive mixed strategies defined on the power set of the
group. As mentioned before, this requires some care since the product of finitely
additive measures is not uniquely defined on the power set of the Cartesian product
of the groups, but only on the algebra generated by the cylinders. Since we want to
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integrate payoff functions that are not measurable with respect to this algebra, we
need to select a suitable extension of the product measure. We propose a natural
class of extensions by considering an average over all possible orders of integration.
We show that the equilibrium exists and it does not depend on the way we choose
this average. We characterize the equilibrium strategies and prove that they are
the invariant means over the group that solve a suitable variational problem. The
equilibrium payoffs have a very simple form. To avoid drowning our result in a sea of
measure-theoretic technicalities, we first develop the theory for games on countable
groups; then we show how it can be extended to uncountable groups, under suitable
assumptions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and states the
main result. Section 3 proves a variational principle that is of interest per se and is
used in the proof of the main result. Section 4 contains the proof of the main result.
Section 5 examines some interesting generalizations. Section 6 considers several ex-
amples. Section 7 deals with uncountable groups. Section 8 provides some conclusive
remarks.
2 Group games
2.1 Finite games
Consider the classical matching pennies game
A B
A −1, 1 1, −1
B 1, −1 −1, 1
(2.1)
We know that the unique equilibrium of this game is the profile of mixed strategies
((1/2, 1/2), (1/2, 1/2)).
Notice that the matching pennies game can be re-written as follows. Make the
set {A,B} a finite group1 by endowing it with the binary operation ∗ defined as
A ∗ A = B ∗B = B, A ∗B = B ∗ A = A.
Define φ : {A,B} → R as follows:
φ(x) =
{
1 for x = A,
−1 for x = B.
1A set G with a binary operation ∗ is called a group if the operation is associative, it has a unit
element, and every element has an inverse. If the operation is commutative, then the group is called
abelian.
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Consider a game played by players 1 and 2, where each player’s pure strategy set is
{A,B} and the payoffs are
u1(x, y) = −u2(x, y) = φ(x ∗ y), for x, y ∈ {A,B}.
The game that we just described is nothing else than the matching pennies game
defined in (2.1).
This suggests the following generalization. Consider a finite group (G, ∗) and N
functions φ1, . . . , φN : G → R. Given a set of players P = {1, . . . , N}, for i ∈ P let
ui : G
N → R be defined as
ui(x1, . . . , xN ) = φi(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN ). (2.2)
For φ := (φ1, . . . , φN), call G (P,G,φ) the game where the set of players is P , each
player’s set of pure strategies is G, and player i’s payoff function is given by (2.2). Call
P(G) the set of all probability measures on 2G. A probability measure λ ∈ P(G) is
invariant if for all x, y ∈ G we have λ(x) = λ(x ∗ y). Observe that finite groups have
a unique invariant measure, that is, the uniform measure. We will see in the next
sections that a countable group may have many invariant measures.
Proposition 2.1. The game G (P,G,φ) admits an equilibrium in mixed strategies
(λ, . . . , λ), with λ invariant on G.
Proof. For µ1, . . . , µN ∈ P(G), define
ui(µ1, . . . , µN) =
∑
x1∈G
· · ·
∑
xN∈G
ui(x1, . . . , xN )µ1(x1) · · ·µN(xN).
Then we have to prove that for all i ∈ P and all µi ∈ P(G) we have
ui(λ, . . . , λ) ≥ ui(λ, . . . , λ, µi, λ, . . . , λ). (2.3)
Notice that, by definition of ui, for all j ∈ P , for all x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xN ∈ G
we have∑
xj∈G
ui(x1, . . . , xj , . . . , xN )λ(xj) =
∑
xj∈G
φi(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xj ∗ · · · ∗ xN )λ(xj)
=
∑
yj∈G
φi(yj)λ(x
−1
j−1 ∗ · · · ∗ x
−1
1 ∗ yj ∗ x
−1
N ∗ · · · ∗ x
−1
j+1)
=
∑
yj∈G
φi(yj)λ(yj),
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where we used the change of variable yj = x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xj ∗ · · · ∗ xN . Hence
ui(λ, . . . , λ) =
∑
x1∈G
· · ·
∑
xN∈G
φi(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN)λ(x1) · · ·λ(xN )
=
∑
yj∈G
φi(yj)λ(yj)
=
∑
x1∈G
· · ·
∑
xi∈G
· · ·
∑
xN∈G
φi(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN )λ(x1) · · ·µi(xi) · · ·λ(xN)
= ui(λ, . . . , λ, µi, λ, . . . , λ),
that is, (2.3) holds.
Morrison (2010) proved an analogous result for zero-sum games.
In the rest of the paper we will find conditions for the existence of equilibria in
countable games, that, among other things, allow to extend Proposition 2.1 to the
case of countable strategy sets.
2.2 Countable games
Given a set of players P = {1, . . . , N}, a countable set S and bounded functions
ui : S
N → [0, 1], i ∈ P , consider a game G = 〈P, S, (ui)i∈P 〉, where S is the strategy
set of all players, and ui is the payoff function of player i.
As mentioned in the Introduction, existence of mixed equilibria may fail if only
countably additive mixed strategies are allowed. Therefore we consider a mixed ex-
tension of the game G where the space of mixed strategies is P(S), the space of all
finitely additive probability measures on S. When doing this, a selection problem
immediately arises. Given µ1, . . . , µN ∈ P(S), a product measure ⊗
N
i=1µi is uniquely
defined only on the algebra generated by the cylinders S × · · · × S × A × S · · · × S,
for all A ⊂ S. This product measure can be (non-uniquely) extended to the power
set 2S×···×S. Different extensions correspond to different values of the expected payoff∫
S×···×S
u d ⊗Ni=1 µi. Here we consider a parametric class of possible extensions that
has the advantage of being easily computable. Its simpler bivariate version has been
used for zero-sum two-person games by Schervish and Seidenfeld (1996). Call Σ(P )
the space of permutations of P . Let ν ∈ P(Σ(P )) and µ1, . . . , µN ∈ P(S). For
i ∈ P , let ui : S
N → [0, 1]. Define
uνi (µ1, . . . , µN) :=
∑
pi∈Σ(P )
ν(π)
∫
S
. . .
∫
S
ui(x1, . . . , xN) dµpi(1)(xpi(1)) . . . dµpi(N)(xpi(N)).
(2.4)
This clearly defines an extension µ1⊠ν · · ·⊠ν µN of ⊗
N
i=1µi to 2
S×···×S as follows. For
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A ⊂ S × · · · × S
µ1⊠ν · · ·⊠νµN(A) =
∑
pi∈Σ(P )
ν(π)
∫
S
. . .
∫
S
1A(x1, . . . , xN ) dµpi(1)(xpi(1)) . . . dµpi(N)(xpi(N)),
(2.5)
where 1A is the indicator function of the set A.
For properties of integration with respect to finitely additive measures we refer
the reader to Hildebrandt (1934), Dunford and Schwartz (1988), de Finetti (1972),
and Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao (1983). Since every bounded function on a
countable set is integrable with respect to any finitely additive probability measure,
we do not need any measure-theoretical assumption.
We can now state our main theorem. Let (G, ∗) be a countable group2 and given
φ1, . . . , φN : G→ [0, 1], define
ui(x1, . . . , xN ) = φi(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN ). (2.6)
For φ = (φ1, . . . , φN) call G (P, S,φ, ν) the mixed extension of the game G when ui is
defined as in (2.6) and the product measure of the finitely additive mixed strategies
is selected as in (2.5).
Theorem 2.2. If (G, ∗) is a countable abelian group, then the game G (P,G,φ, ν)
admits a Nash equilibrium that does not depend on ν.
A more general version of Theorem 2.2 will be proved in Section 4.
3 A variational principle for FC-groups
In this section we prove a preliminary result that has some interest per se since it
represents a new variational principle for a useful class of groups that we now define.
Definition 3.1. A countable group G is called an FC-group if for all g ∈ G, the
conjugacy class {h ∗ g ∗ h−1 : h ∈ G} is finite.
FC-groups have been introduced by Baer (1948) and Neumann (1951). Among
others, abelian groups are FC, since every conjugacy class is a singleton.
Let G be a countable group, A ⊂ G and g ∈ G. Fix the following notation
g ∗ A = {g ∗ a : a ∈ A} A ∗ g = {a ∗ g : a ∈ A}.
Definition 3.2. A finitely additive probability measure µ on the power set of G is
called
• left-invariant mean, if µ(A) = µ(g ∗ A), for all g ∈ G and A ⊂ G,
2In the whole paper all countable groups will be endowed with the discrete topology.
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• right-invariant mean, if µ(A) = µ(A ∗ g), for all g ∈ G and A ⊂ G,
• invariant mean, if it is both left- and right-invariant.
For a given countable group G, we call L (G), R(G) and I (G) the class of all left-
invariant, right-invariant and invariant means on G, respectively.
It is well-known that the existence of a left-invariant mean is equivalent to the
existence of a right-invariant mean, that is equivalent to the existence of an invariant
mean3.
Definition 3.3. A countable group is called amenable if it admits a left-invariant
mean.
Amenable groups have been introduced by von Neumann (1929) in relation to
the Tarski paradox and they form a hugely studied class of groups still nowadays.
Every finite group is amenable, just taking the uniform measure; abelian groups are
amenable by a standard but non-trivial argument making use of the Markov-Kakutani
fixed point theorem. The simplest example of a non-amenable group is the free group
on two generators4.
We use the following theorem, which appeared in Paterson (1979, Theorem 3.2).
Theorem 3.4. Let G be a countable amenable FC-group. Then
R(G) = L (G) = I (G).
This means that we have no distinctions between left- and -right-invariant means.
Given a countable amenable group G, ℓ∞(G) denotes the Banach space of all
bounded real-valued function on G. The main result of this section is the following
variational principle.
Theorem 3.5. If G is a countable amenable FC-group and f : G → [0, 1], then for
all π ∈ Σ(P ) and all λ2, . . . , λN ∈ I (G) the functional Ψ : P(G)→ R defined as
Ψ(µ) =
∫
. . .
∫ ∫
f(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN) dµ(xpi(1)) dλ2(xpi(2)) . . . dλN(xpi(N))
attains its maximum at some λ ∈ I (G).
3Indeed, given a left-invariant mean λ, one can define a right-invariant mean ρ by setting ρ(A) =
λ(A−1), where A−1 = {a−1 : a ∈ A}. Now one can define an invariant mean µ by the formula
µ(A) =
∫
G
λ(A ∗ g−1) dρ(g).
4The free group on two generators, say x and y, is the group of all words in the letters
x, x−1, y, y−1, equipped with the operation of concatenation of words, where only the simplifica-
tions x∗x−1 = x−1 ∗x = y ∗y−1 = y−1 ∗y = e are allowed, being e the empty word. It was observed
by von Neumann himself that this group, usually denoted by F2, is not amenable. A celebrated
example of Ol′sˇanski˘ı shows the existence of non-amenable groups which do not contain F2 (see
Ol′sˇanski˘ı, 1980).
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Remark 3.6. The space P(G) is a closed subset of the unit ball of the dual of ℓ∞(G)
and therefore is compact in the weak* topology by the Banach-Alaoglu theorem (see,
e.g., Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Theorem 5.93) Nevertheless the existence of the
maximum for the functional Ψ is not automatic, since it is not continuous. To see
this take G = (Z,+), N = 2, and consider the functional
Ψ(µ) :=
∫ ∫
1N(x+ y) dµ(x) dλ(y),
with λ ∈ I (Z) such that λ(N) = 1. Call µα a net of probability measures having
finite support in −N and converging to some µ ∈ I (Z). Observe that µ(N) = 0. If
Ψ were continuous we would have
Ψ(µ) = lim
α
Ψ(µα). (3.1)
But
Ψ(µ) =
∫ ∫
1N(x+ y) dµ(x) dλ(y) = 0,
Ψ(µα) =
∫ ∫
1N(x+ y) dµα(x) dλ(y)
=
∫ ∫
1N(x+ y) dλ(y) dµα(x) = 1 for all α,
which contradicts (3.1).
Denote
I(f) =
{∫
f(x) dλ(x) : λ ∈ I (G)
}
.
The following lemma is folklore and follows from the fact that the set I (G) is
convex and weak*-compact, when seen as a subset of the dual of ℓ∞(G).
Lemma 3.7. The set I(f) ⊂ R is convex and compact.
This lemma guarantees that the following number is well defined.
I(f)+ := max I(f). (3.2)
Lemma 3.8. Let G be a countable amenable FC-group and f : G → [0, 1]. If there
exist µ ∈ P(G) and L ∈ R such that either∫
f(x ∗ y) dµ(x) ≥ L for all y ∈ G, (3.3)
or ∫
f(y ∗ x) dµ(x) ≥ L for all y ∈ G, (3.4)
then there exists λ ∈ I (G) such that
∫
f(x) dλ(x) ≥ L.
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Given a set A, its cardinality is denoted by |A|.
Definition 3.9. A sequence Fn of finite subsets of G is called a left-Følner sequence
for G if for all g ∈ G one has
lim
n→∞
|(g ∗ Fn)△Fn|
|Fn|
= 0
and a right-Følner sequence for G if for all g ∈ G one has
lim
n→∞
|(Fn ∗ g)△Fn|
|Fn|
= 0,
where △ stands for the symmetric difference of sets; i.e. A△B = (A∪B)\ (A∩B) =
(A \B) ∪ (B \ A).
Følner (1955) proved that such sequences exist for all countable amenable groups.
Proof of Lemma 3.8. Let Fn be a left-Følner sequence for G. Consider the sequence
of measures µn defined by
µn(A) =
1
|Fn|
∑
g∈Fn
µ(A ∗ g)
and let λ be a weak* limit of (a subnet µc(α) of) this sequence. First we prove that
λ ∈ I (G). Indeed, for all A ⊂ G and for all h ∈ G, one has
|λ(A ∗ h)− λ(A)| = lim
α
|µc(α)(A ∗ h)− µc(α)(A)|
= lim
α
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
g∈Fc(α)
1
|Fc(α)|
(
µc(α)(A ∗ h ∗ g)− µc(α)(A ∗ g)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Observe that the terms that are not in (h ∗ Fc(α))△Fc(α) cancel out. Majorizing with
1 each of the remaining terms, we get
|λ(A ∗ h)− λ(A)| ≤ lim
α
|(h ∗ Fc(α))△Fc(α)|
|Fc(α)|
= 0,
which proves that λ ∈ R(G). Theorem 3.4 implies that λ ∈ I (G). Now we prove
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that if (3.3) holds, then
∫
f(x) dλ(x) ≥ L. Indeed, we have∫
f(x) dλ(x) = lim
α
∫
f(x) dµc(α)(x)
= lim
α
∫
1
|Fc(α)|
∑
g∈Fc(α)
f(x) dµ(x ∗ g)
= lim
α
∫
1
|Fc(α)|
∑
g∈Fc(α)
f(x ∗ g−1) dµ(x)
= lim
α
1
|Fc(α)|
∑
g∈Fc(α)
∫
f(x ∗ g−1) dµ(x)
≥ L.
where the inequality stems from the hypothesis that each of the |Fc(α)| summands is
larger or equal L. The proof for the case (3.4) is similar.
Given a group G we call GN the direct product of G, N times, endowed with the
component-wise operation, still denoted by ∗, with a little abuse of notation. If G is
amenable, then GN is amenable, too (Day, 1957). Furthermore, a simple computation
shows that if G is an FC-group, then also GN is an FC-group.
Lemma 3.10. Under the hypotheses of Theorem 3.4
max
{∫
f(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN ) dσ(x1, . . . , xN ) : σ ∈ I (G
N)
}
= I(f)+, (3.5)
where I(f)+ is defined as in (3.2).
Proof. For
ψ(x1, . . . , xN ) = f(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN) (3.6)
define the set
R ⊃ Λ(ψ) =
{∫
ψ(x1, . . . , xN ) dσ(x1, . . . , xN) : σ ∈ I (G
N)
}
and call L = maxΛ(ψ), which exists by Lemma 3.7. We have to prove that L = I(f)+.
Proof of the inequality L ≥ I(f)+. By Lemma 3.7 there exists λ ∈ I (G) such
that
∫
f(x) dλ(x) = I(f)+. Let λ⊗N denote the measure on GN defined by the
functional
ℓ∞(GN) ∋ γ 7→
∫
. . .
∫
γ(x1, . . . , xN) dλ(x1) . . . dλ(xN ).
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First we show that λ⊗N ∈ I (GN ). Indeed for all γ ∈ ℓ∞(GN) and for all (g1, . . . , gN) ∈
GN we have∫
γ((g1, . . . , gN) ∗ (x1, . . . , xN )) dλ
⊗N(x1, . . . , xN)
=
∫
γ(g1 ∗ x1, . . . , gN ∗ xN ) dλ
⊗N(x1, . . . , xN )
=
∫
. . .
∫
γ(g1 ∗ x1, . . . , gN ∗ xN) dλ(x1) . . . dλ(xN )
=
∫
. . .
∫
γ(x1, g2 ∗ x2,, . . . , gN ∗ xN ) dλ(x1) . . . dλ(xN )
=
∫
. . .
∫
γ(x1, x2, g3 ∗ x3, . . . , gN ∗ xN ) dλ(x1) . . . dλ(xN )
...
=
∫
. . .
∫
γ(x1, . . . , xN) dλ(x1) . . . dλ(xN),
where the third equality stems from the fact that λ is a left invariant mean, therefore∫
γ(g1 ∗ x1, . . . , gN ∗ xN ) dλ(x1) =
∫
γ(x1, g2 ∗ x2, . . . , gN ∗ xN ) dλ(x1).
For the forth equality define ζ(x2, . . . , xN ) =
∫
γ(x1, x2, . . . , xN) dλ(x1). Then, since
λ is a left invariant mean, we have∫
ζ(g2 ∗ x2, g3 ∗ x3, . . . , gN ∗ xN ) dλ(x2) =
∫
ζ(x2, g3 ∗ x3, . . . , gN ∗ xN) dλ(x2),
i.e.,∫ ∫
γ(x1,g2 ∗ x2, g3 ∗ x3, . . . , gN ∗ xN ) dλ(x1) dλ(x2)
=
∫ ∫
γ(x1, x2, g3 ∗ x3, . . . , gN ∗ xN) dλ(x1) dλ(x2).
The remaining equalities are obtained analogously. We have then shown that λ⊗N ∈
L (GN). By Theorem 3.4 applied to the FC-group GN it follows that λ⊗N ∈ I (GN).
Now we show that
∫
f(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN ) dλ
⊗N(x1, . . . , xN) = I(f)
+. We have∫
f(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN ) dλ
⊗N (x1, . . . , xN ) =
∫
. . .
∫
f(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN ) dλ(x1) . . . dλ(xN )
=
∫
. . .
∫
f(x1) dλ(x1) . . . dλ(xN )
=
∫
. . .
∫
I(f)+ dλ(x2) . . . dλ(xN )
= I(f)+.
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This shows that I(f)+ ∈ Λ(ψ) and therefore I(f)+ ≤ L.
Proof of the inequality L ≤ I(f)+. Let σ ∈ I (GN) be such that∫
f(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN ) dσ(x1, . . . , xN) = L
(such a measure exists by Lemma 3.7 applied to the group GN and to the function
ψ(x1, . . . , xN) = f(x1 ∗ · · ·∗xN )) and let σα be a net of countably additive probability
measures on GN converging to σ in the weak* topology. Define a countably additive
probability measure µα on G by setting for all x1 ∈ G
µα(x1) =
∑
(x2,...,xN )∈GN−1
σα(x1 ∗ (x2 ∗ · · · ∗ xN )
−1, x2, . . . , xN).
To show that this is indeed a countably additive probability measure notice that for
each x1 ∈ G we have µα(x1) ≥ 0 and therefore it suffices to show that
∑
x1∈G
µα(x1) =
1. This follows from the observation that µα(x1) = σα(Ax1), where
Ax1 =
{
(x1 ∗ (x2 ∗ · · · ∗ xN )
−1, x2, . . . , xN ) : (x2, . . . , xN) ∈ G
N−1
}
and the fibers Ax1 form a partition of G
N .
Now, let µ be any weak* limit of a subnet, denoted by µβ, of the net µα. For any
g ∈ G, one has∫
G
f(g ∗ x1) dµ(x1) = lim
β
∫
G
f(g ∗ x1) dµβ(x1)
= lim
β
∑
x1∈G
f(g ∗ x1)µβ(x1)
= lim
β
∑
x1∈G
∑
(x2,...,xN )∈GN−1
f(g ∗ x1)σβ(x1 ∗ (x2 ∗ · · · ∗ xN )
−1, x2, . . . , xN)
= lim
β
∑
(x2,...,xN )∈GN−1
∑
x1∈G
f(g ∗ x1)σβ(x1 ∗ (x2 ∗ · · · ∗ xN )
−1, x2, . . . , xN)
= lim
β
∑
(x2,...,xN )∈GN−1
∑
z∈G∗(x2∗···∗xN )−1
f(g ∗ z ∗ x2 ∗ · · · ∗ xN )σβ(z, x2, . . . , xN ),
where in the last equality we put z = x1 ∗ (x2 ∗ · · · ∗xN)
−1. Observe that in the fourth
equality we can exchange the order of summation since the series are nonnegative
and convergent. For the same reason we can now replace G ∗ (x2 ∗ · · · ∗ xN )
−1 with
G (the mapping x 7→ x ∗ (x2 ∗ · · · ∗ xN)
−1 is a permutation). Therefore, using again
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(3.6), we have
lim
β
∑
(x2,...,xN )∈GN−1
∑
z∈G∗(x2∗···∗xN )−1
f(g ∗ z ∗ x2 ∗ · · · ∗ xN )σβ(z, x2, . . . , xN )
= lim
β
∑
(z,x2,...,xN )∈GN
f(g ∗ z ∗ x2 ∗ · · · ∗ xN )σβ(z, x2, . . . , xN)
= lim
β
∫
f(g ∗ z ∗ x2 ∗ · · · ∗ xN ) dσβ(z, x2, . . . , xN )
= lim
β
∫
ψ((g, 1G, . . . , 1G) ∗ (z, x2, . . . , xN )) dσβ(z, x2, . . . , xN)
=
∫
ψ((g, 1G, . . . , 1G) ∗ (z, x2, . . . , xN )) dσ(z, x2, . . . , xN )
=
∫
ψ(z, x2, . . . , xN ) dσ(z, x2, . . . , xN )
=
∫
f(z ∗ x2 ∗ · · · ∗ xN ) dσ(z, x2, . . . , xN )
= L.
We have proved that
∫
G
f(g ∗x1) dµ(x1) = L for all g ∈ G. Therefore, by Lemma 3.8,
there exists λ ∈ I (G) such that
∫
f(x) dλ(x) ≥ L. It follows that I(f)+ ≥ L.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Call λ = (λ2, . . . , λN) and
Sλ,pi = sup
µ∈P(G)
{∫
. . .
∫ ∫
f(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN ) dµ(xpi(1)) dλ2(xpi(2)) . . . dλN(xpi(N))
}
.
(3.7)
By Lemma 3.7, we know that Sλ,pi ≥ I(f)
+, for all λ and π. We recall that the value
I(f)+ is attained, basically by definition, by an invariant mean. So it suffices to show
that Sλ,pi = I(f)
+. Now, by contradiction, suppose that there exist µ ∈ P(G) and
λ2, . . . , λN ∈ I (G) such that∫
. . .
∫ ∫
f(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN) dµ(xpi(1)) dλ2(xpi(2)) . . . dλN(xpi(N)) =: L > I(f)
+.
Call σ the measure on GN defined by the functional
ℓ∞(GN) ∋ γ 7→
∫
GN
γ(x1, . . . , xN) dσ(x1, . . . , xN)
=
∫
. . .
∫ ∫
γ(x1, . . . , xN ) dµ(xpi(1)) dλ2(xpi(2)) . . . dλN (xpi(N)).
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Define ψ(x1, . . . , xN) = f(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN). We start considering the case π(1) < N .
Setting π(1) = j, for any (g1, . . . , gN) ∈ G
N we have∫
ψ((x1, . . . , xN ) ∗ (g1, . . . , gN)) dσ(x1, . . . , xN) (3.8)
=
∫
ψ((x1 ∗ g1, . . . , gN ∗ xN )) dσ(x1, . . . , xN)
=
∫
. . .
∫ ∫
f(x1 ∗ g1 ∗ x2 ∗ g2 · · · ∗ xN ∗ gN) dµ(xpi(1)) dλ2(xpi(2)) . . . dλN (xpi(N))
=
∫
. . .
∫ ∫
f(x1 ∗ x2 ∗ · · · ∗ xN ) dµ(xpi(1)) dλ2(xpi(2)) . . . dλN (xpi(N))
= L,
where the third equality can be shown by setting
ξ(x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xN) =
∫
f(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN) dµ(xj)
and noticing that∫
. . .
∫ ∫
f(x1 ∗ g1 ∗ · · · ∗ xj−1 ∗ gj−1 ∗ xj ∗ gj ∗ xj+1 ∗ gj+1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN ∗ gN)
dµ(xj) dλ2(xpi(2)) . . . dλN (xpi(N))
=
∫
. . .
∫
ξ(x1 ∗ g1, . . . , xj−1 ∗ gj−1, gj ∗ xj+1 ∗ gj+1, xj+2 ∗ gj+2, . . . , xN ∗ gN)
dλ2(xpi(2)) . . . dλN (xpi(N))
=
∫
. . .
∫
ξ(x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xN) dλ2(xpi(2)) . . . dλN(xpi(N))
=
∫
. . .
∫ ∫
f(x1 ∗ x2 ∗ · · · ∗ xN ) dµ(xpi(1)) dλ2(xpi(2)) . . . dλN(xpi(N)).
Therefore, we can apply Lemma 3.8 to the amenable FC-groupGN and to the function
ψ(x1, . . . , xN). This means that there exists an invariant measure ρ
′ ∈ I (GN) such
that
∫
f(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN ) dρ
′(x1, . . . , xN) ≥ L > I(f)
+. This contradicts Lemma 3.10.
If π(1) = N , then the result can be proved replacing (3.8) with∫
ψ((g1, . . . , gN) ∗ (x1, . . . , xN)) dσ(x1, . . . , xN )
and following the steps of the previous case.
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4 Proof of the main result
As before, G is a countable amenable FC-group and, for i ∈ P , let φi : G→ [0, 1]
and λi ∈ I (G) be such that ∫
φi dλi = I(φi)
+.
Every abelian group is an amenable FC-group, hence Theorem 2.2 is a corollary
of the following more general result.
Theorem 4.1. If G is a countable amenable FC-group, then the profile of strategies
(λ1, . . . , λN) is a Nash equilibrium for the game G (P,G,φ, ν).
Proof. We have to prove that for all i ∈ P and all µi ∈ P(G) we have
uνi (λ1, . . . , λi, . . . , λN) ≥ u
ν
i (λ1, . . . , λi−1, µi, λi+1, . . . , λN).
Using (2.4), we know that
uνi (λ1, . . . , λi, . . . , λN) =
∑
pi∈Σ(P )
ν(π)
∫
G
. . .
∫
G
ui(x1, . . . , xN) dλpi(1)(xpi(1)) . . . dλpi(N)(xpi(N)),
where ui(x1, . . . , xN) = φi(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN ). Since all λj are invariant, each of the sum-
mands of uνi (λ1, . . . , λi, . . . , λN) is equal to the corresponding summand for
uνi (λ1, . . . , λi−1, µi, λi+1, . . . , λN), except when π(1) = i. If we call Σi(P ) the class
of all permutations of P such that π(1) = i, then all we have to prove is
∑
pi∈Σi(P )
ν(π)
∫
G
. . .
∫
G
∫
G
ui(x1, . . . , xN ) dλi(xi) dλpi(2)(xpi(2)) . . . dλpi(N)(xpi(N))
≥
∑
pi∈Σi(P )
ν(π)
∫
G
. . .
∫
G
∫
G
ui(x1, . . . , xN ) dµi(xi) dλpi(2)(xpi(2)) . . . dλpi(N)(xpi(N)).
This inequality can be shown to hold summand by summand. More precisely, by
Theorem 3.5 we know that each summand with µi is majorized by some invariant
measure; but λ¯i maximizes the value over all invariant measures, so the result follows.
5 Some generalizations
Here we consider some generalizations of Theorem 4.1. The first extension allows
us to show the existence of an equilibrium in Wald’s game, a classical example of
countable game that does not admit equilibria in σ-additive mixed strategies.
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5.1 Transformations of group operations
Let η1, . . . , ηN : G→ G be bijections and let
uηi (x1, . . . , xN) = φi(η1(x1) ∗ · · · ∗ ηN(xN )) for i ∈ P . (5.1)
For η = (η1, . . . , ηN) call G (P,G,φ,η, ν) the game where the payoffs are given by the
mixed extensions of (5.1), as in (2.4).
Theorem 5.1. If G is a countable amenable FC-group, then the game G (P,G,φ,η, ν)
admits a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Call
ui(y1, . . . , yN) = φi(y1 ∗ · · · ∗ yN).
By Theorem 4.1 we know that the game G (P,G,φ, ν) admits a Nash equilibrium
given by (λ1, . . . , λN). Therefore if we define for i ∈ P a measure ρi on 2
G as follows
ρi(A) = λi(ηi(A)),
then the profile (ρ1, . . . , ρN) is a Nash equilibrium of G (P,G,φ,η, ν).
5.2 Graph games
Theorem 2.2 requires that the payoff of each player be a function of the group
operation over the strategies of all players. This hypothesis is quite restrictive. The
next theorem substantially weakens it by allowing the payoff of player i to be a
function of the group operation over a—possibly small—subset of players, provided
it includes player i herself and at least another player. This can be interpreted as
a game over a graph, where the payoff function of each player depends only on her
action and the actions of her neighbors.
For every i ∈ P let Pi ⊂ P be such that i ∈ Pi and |Pi| ≥ 2. Consider functions
φi : G→ [0, 1] such that
ui(x1, . . . , xN ) = φi(∗j∈Pixj), (5.2)
that is, the payoff of player i depends only on the strategies of her neighbors.
Call P = (P1, . . . , PN) and define the game G (P,P , G,φ, ν) where the payoff
functions are as in (5.2).
Theorem 5.2. If G is a countable amenable FC-group, then the game G (P,P , G,φ, ν)
admits a Nash equilibrium.
The proof of this theorem follows the line of the proof of Theorem 4.1 and is
therefore omitted.
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6 Examples
6.1 Games on Z
As the next proposition shows, when the game is played on Z, the equilibrium of
Theorem 4.1 has an interesting structure, that is, each equilibrium strategy has its
mass either entirely adherent to −∞ or to +∞, or if it is split between the two, then
it can be split in any possible way.
Proposition 6.1. Consider a game G (P,Z,φ, ν). Let (λ1, . . . , λN) be an equilibrium
for this game, where λ1, . . . , λN ∈ I (Z). Then, for all i ∈ P , one of the following
three possibilities is true
(a) λi(N) = 0,
(b) λi(N) = 1,
(c) if 0 < λi(N) < 1, then for any δ ∈ [0, 1] there exists another equilibrium strategy
λ′i ∈ I (Z) with λ
′
i(N) = δ.
Proof. Assume that neither (a) nor (b) holds. We prove that (c) must be true.
Suppose that λi ∈ I (Z) is an equilibrium strategy for player i and λi(−N) = θ ∈
(0, 1). Call
K =
∫
φi dλi, θK1 =
∫
−N
φi dλi, (1− θ)K2 =
∫
N
φi dλi.
Then
K = θK1 + (1− θ)K2.
Assume that K2 > K1. Consider now a measure λ
′
i ∈ I (Z) such that λ
′
i(−N) = 0
and for A ⊂ N we have λ′i(A) = (1− θ)
−1λi(A). Then∫
φi dλ
′
i = K2 > K,
which, by Theorem 4.1, contradicts the fact that λi is an equilibrium strategy. A
similar argument holds if K1 > K2.
It is easy to see that if K1 = K2, then any measure λ
′′
i such that for 0 < κ < θ
−1
λ′′i (A) = κλi(A) for A ⊂ −N,
λ′′i (A) = (1− θκ)(1− θ)
−1λi(A) for A ⊂ N,
satisfies
∫
φi dλ
′′
i = K and therefore is an equilibrium strategy. This proves part
(c).
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Example 6.2 (Matching pennies). Consider the following countable version of match-
ing pennies. The strategy set of each of the two players is Z and the payoff functions
are
u1(x, y) = 1− u2(x, y) = 12Z(x+ y),
where kZ is the set of multiples of k. This game is equivalent to the one where players
choose only Odd or Even and player 1 wins if both players make the same choice.
Any profile of strategies (µ1, µ2) such that µ1(2Z) = µ2(2Z) = 1/2 is an equilibrium
of the game.
The game can be generalized to N players as follows. Consider a partition
A1, . . . , AN of Z and payoff functions
ui(x1, . . . , xN) = 1Ai(x1 + · · ·+ xN).
If for each i ∈ P the measure
λi ∈ arg max
λi∈I (Z)
λi(Ai),
then, by Theorem 4.1, the profile (λ1, . . . , λN) is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
Notice that, if all sets A1, . . . , AN are periodic (not necessarily with the same
period), then for all λ, λ′ ∈ I (Z) we have
λ(Ai) = λ
′(Ai),
Therefore any profile of invariant measures is an equilibrium. Let m be the lowest
common multiple of the periods mi of the Ai’s.
Consider now them congruence classesmZ+k. Any profile of probability measures
(µ1, . . . , µN) such that for i ∈ P and k ∈ {0, . . . , m− 1}
µi(mZ+ k) = λj(mZ+ k) = 1/m
is an equilibrium, too.
Example 6.3 (Wald’s game). The following game was introduced by Wald (1945)
as a counterexample to the existence of minmax in zero-sum two-person games when
the sets of strategies for both players are infinite. Let the strategy set be Z and
u1(x, y) = 1− u2(x, y) =

1 if x > y,
1/2 if x = y,
0 if x < y.
Call z := −y; then the payoff function becomes
u1(x, z) =

1 if x+ z > 0,
1/2 if x+ z = 0,
0 if x+ z < 0.
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Then u1(x, z) is an example of φ(x + z) with + as the group operation. Applying
Theorem 5.1 we obtain the equilibrium (λ, ρ) with λ, ρ ∈ I (Z) and λ(N) = ρ(−N) =
1. This shows the striking difference between countably additive and finitely additive
extensions of countable games.
6.2 Games on Z2
Consider a game where the strategy set of each player is Z2 and for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
the payoff function ui is
ui(x1 + · · ·+ xN ) = 1Ci(x1 + · · ·+ xN ), (6.1)
where Ci is some open cone, i.e., Ci is an open subset of R
2 such that if x ∈ Ci, then
βx ∈ Ci for all β ∈ R+.
Proposition 6.4. Let φi = 1Ci. If λi ∈ I (Z
2) and λi(Ci) = 1 for all i ∈ P , then
the profile (λ1, . . . , λN) is an equilibrium of the game G (P,Z
2,φ, ν).
Proof. By Theorem 4.1 a measure λi is an equilibrium strategy if
λi = arg max
λi∈I (Z2)
λi(Ci).
Since λi(Ci) ≤ 1 all we need to prove is that for each open cone Ci there exists an
invariant measure λi such that λi(Ci) = 1. This is achieved by using Følner sequences
as follows. For every open cone Ci there exists a convex open cone C
∗
i ⊂ Ci. We now
prove the existence of λi such that λi(C
∗
i ) = 1. Call Qn := {−n, . . . , n}
2 ⊂ Z2 and
Fn := Qn ∩ C
∗
i .
Claim 6.5. The sequence Fn is a Følner sequence.
Proof of Claim 6.5. We need to prove that for all g ∈ Z2 we have
lim
n→∞
|(g ∗ Fn)△Fn|
|Fn|
= 0.
There exists δ > 0 such that for n large enough |Fn| > δn
2. Moreover if g = (g1, g2),
then |(g ∗ Fn)△Fn| ≤ 4|g1g2|n. This proves the Claim.
Define a probability measure µn on 2
Z2 as follows:
µn(A) =
|A ∩ Fn|
|Fn|
.
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Call λi a weak* limit of a subnet µc(α) of µn. First we prove that λi ∈ I (Z
2). For
all A ⊂ Z2 and for all g ∈ Z2
|λi(A+ g)− λi(A)| = lim
α
∣∣∣∣ |(A+ g) ∩ Fc(α)||Fc(α)| − |A ∩ Fc(α)||Fc(α)|
∣∣∣∣
= lim
α
∣∣∣∣ |A ∩ (Fc(α) − g)||Fc(α)| − |A ∩ Fc(α)||Fc(α)|
∣∣∣∣
≤ lim
α
∣∣∣∣ |A ∩ ((Fc(α) − g)△Fc(α))||Fc(α)|
∣∣∣∣
= 0,
where the inequality is due to the fact that
A ∩ ((Fc(α) − g) \ (A ∩ Fc(α))) ⊂ A ∩ ((Fc(α) − g)△Fc(α)).
Then we prove that λi(C
∗
i ) = 1. Indeed
λi(C
∗
i ) = lim
α
|C∗i ∩ Fc(α)|
|Fc(α)|
.
Since Fc(α) ⊂ C
∗
i for all α, we have
|C∗i ∩ Fc(α)|
|Fc(α)|
= 1 for all α.
6.3 Games on Q ∩ [0, 1] mod 1
Take G = Q ∩ [0, 1] equipped with the sum modulo 1. Then G is a countable
abelian group, so it is an amenable FC-group. Observe that any invariant mean λ
on G satisfies the following property. With an abuse of language we use the symbol
[a, b] to denote the set {x ∈ G : a ≤ x ≤ b}.
Proposition 6.6. For every λ ∈ I (G) and every a, b ∈ [0, 1], a < b, we have
λ([a, b]) = b− a.
Proof. Observe that, by invariance, for every n ∈ N
λ
([
0,
1
n
])
= λ
([
1
n
,
2
n
])
= · · · = λ
([
n− 1
n
, 1
])
=
1
n
.
Hence, by finite additivity, if a = k/n and b = m/n, then
λ([a, b]) = λ
([
k
n
,
m
n
])
=
m− k
n
.
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Therefore any two invariant means on G coincide on the algebra generated by
intervals in G, but they can be extended in many different ways to 2G.
Proposition 6.7. Call c the cardinality of R. Then |I (G)| ≥ 2c.
Proof. If G is endowed with the discrete topology, then it is a locally compact group,
whose Haar measure is the counting measure. It follows that the set of essentially
(with respect to the Haar measure) bounded real-valued functions on G is equal
to ℓ∞(G). Therefore Chou (1970, Theorem on page 444) can be used to get the
result.
Consider now a game on G where for i ∈ P ,
φi(x) = 1Ai(x).
If A1, . . . , AN are in the algebra generated by intervals, then every profile (λ1, . . . , λN),
with λi ∈ I (G) is an equilibrium. Otherwise the equilibrium strategy for player i is
λi ∈ arg max
λ∈I (G)
λ(Ai).
Example 6.8 (Rock-scissors-paper). The classical rock-scissors-paper game is played
by two players whose strategy set is G = {R, S, P}. The payoff for player 1 is
u1(R, S) = u1(P,R) = u1(S, P ) = 1,
u1(R,R) = u1(P, P ) = u1(S, S) = 1/2, (6.2)
u1(S,R) = u1(R,P ) = u1(P, S) = 0,
and u2(x, y) = 1−u1(x, y). It is well known that the unique equilibrium of this game
is the profile of uniform mixed strategies for each player.
We can endow the set G with an operation ∗ that makes it an abelian group, as
follows:
R ∗R = P ∗ S = S ∗ P = R
R ∗ P = P ∗R = S ∗ S = P
R ∗ S = S ∗R = P ∗ P = S.
Note that R is the unit element and
R−1 = R,P−1 = S, S−1 = P.
Actually the group G can be identified with Z/3Z = {0¯, 1¯, 2¯} using the following
isomorphism Φ:
Φ(R) = 0¯, Φ(P ) = 1¯, Φ(S) = 2¯.
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Therefore (6.2) can be re-written as follows.
u1(x, y) =

1 if y ∗ x−1 = S,
1/2 if y ∗ x−1 = R,
0 if y ∗ x−1 = P .
Thus rock-scissors-paper is a game with payoffs of the form (5.1).
The game can be generalized to a countable setting as follows. Let the strategy
set of each of the two players be the group G equal to [0, 1] ∩ Q equipped with the
sum mod 1 and let, for 0 < α < β < 1, the payoff function be
u1(x, y) =

1 if β < y − x < 1,
1/2 if α ≤ y − x ≤ β, or y − x = 0,
0 if 0 < y − x < α.
Combining Theorem 5.1 and Proposition 6.6 we can show that every pair of in-
variant means is an equilibrium. To wit, the proof of Theorem 5.1 shows that (λ¯1, λ¯2)
is an equilibrium if
(a) λ¯2 ∈ I (G),
(b) λ˜1 ∈ I (G), where λ˜1(A) = λ¯1(−A),
(c) λ˜1 ∈ argmaxλ∈I (G)
∫
φ1 dλ, where
φ1(x) = 1(β,1)(x) +
1
2
1[α,β](x) +
1
2
1{0}(x),
(d) λ¯2 ∈ argmaxλ∈I (G)
∫
(1− φ1) dλ.
Proposition 6.6 shows that every invariant mean satisfies (c) and (d). Furthermore,
since λ˜1 ∈ I (G) we have, λ¯1 ∈ I (G), too. Therefore every pair of invariant means
satisfies (a)–(d) and hence is an equilibrium.
Example 6.9 (Love and hate). This game is played by an even number of players
N = 2k. The strategy set of each player is Q ∩ [0, 1] mod 1. The payoff functions
have this form for h ∈ {1, . . . , k}
u2h(x1, . . . , x2k) = −d(x2h, x2h+1),
u2h+1(x1, . . . , x2k) = d(x2h+1, x2h+2),
where N + j := j and
d(x, y) = min(|x− y|, 1− |x− y|).
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In words, every even player wants to be as close as possible to the following odd player
and every odd player wants to be as far as possible from the following even player.
If we define
η2h(x) = x, η2h+1(x) = −x,
then the payoffs can be written as
u2h(x1, . . . , x2k) = φ2h(η2h(x2h) + η2h+1(x2h+1)),
u2h+1(x1, . . . , x2k) = φ2h+1(η2h+1(x2h+1) + η2h+2(x2h+2)).
Combining Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 we obtain that there exist equilibria that are in-
variant means for each player.
Remark 6.10. Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 and especially their combination broaden con-
siderably the class of games for which existence of equilibria can be shown using
group-theoretic arguments.
On one hand some of the group games that we have considered are the count-
able version of finite games that have an equilibrium in uniform strategies, see, e.g.,
matching pennies and rock-scissors-paper. On the other hand the finite version of
some other countable group games does not have an equilibrium in uniform strate-
gies, see, e.g., Wald’s game. This shows that the class of countable group games is
not a trivial extension of the class of finite group games.
7 Uncountable games
In this section we consider games G (P,G, u, ν), where G is an uncountable group.
Some hypotheses on G will be needed to generalize the results of the previous sections.
In particular we will require G to be a locally compact metric group, which means that
the group is equipped with a locally compact metrizable topology that is compatible
with the group operation.5 In this case, a classical theorem by Haar (1933) guarantees
the existence of a unique invariant countably additive measure on G. This measure
is finite if and only if the group G is compact, therefore in general this is not a mixed
strategy. Nevertheless the Haar measure was used by von Neumann (1929) to define
amenability.
Denote by L∞(G) the Banach space of all real-valued functions on G that are
essentially bounded with respect to the Haar measure. Given g ∈ G and f ∈ L∞(G),
we denote by Lgf and Rgf respectively the left- and the right-translation of f by g,
i.e.,
(Lgf)(x) = f(g ∗ x) and (Rgf)(x) = f(x ∗ g).
Definition 7.1. A locally compact topological group G is called amenable if there
exists a linear operator T : L∞(G)→ R verifying the following properties:
5As examples of such a group consider for instance (R,+) and S1, the unit circle in R2, where
the group operation is the angle sum mod 2pi.
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Positivity. If f : G→ R+, then T (f) ≥ 0.
Normalization. If f ≡ 1, then T (f) = 1.
Invariance. For all f ∈ L∞(G) and for all g ∈ G, one has
T (Lgf) = T (f) = T (Rgf). (7.1)
A positive and normalized linear operator T that verifies the first (second) equality
in (7.1) is called left-invariant (right-invariant) mean; an operator that is both left-
and right-invariant is called invariant mean.
Any positive and normalized linear operator T : L∞(G) → R defines a finitely
additive probability measure µ on B, the σ-algebra of Borel subsets of G, as follows
µ(A) = T (1A), for all A ∈ B.
Therefore, a locally compact group is amenable if and only if there exists a finitely
additive probability measure on B which is invariant with respect to the group op-
eration.
Now we consider a game G (P,G, u, ν), where for every i ∈ P
ui(x1, . . . , xN ) = φi(x1 ∗ · · · ∗ xN ),
for some Borel-measurable function φi which is assumed to be bounded and integrable
with respect to every finitely additive probability measure on B. The mixed extension
of the game is achieved using (2.4) as in the countable case.
In order to prove the existence of equilibria we need the following two results. The
first is a more general version of Følner’s theorem.
Theorem 7.2 (Følner (1955)). A locally compact group G with Haar measure µ is
amenable if and only if there is a sequence of compact subsets Fn of G such that
µ(Fn)→∞ and
µ(Fn ∗ (g△Fn))
µ(Fn)
→ 0 for all g ∈ G.
The following theorem is folklore, (see, e.g., Merkle, 2000, Theorem 4.3).
Theorem 7.3. The set of finitely supported probability measures on a metric space is
dense, with respect to the weak* topology, in the set of all finitely additive probability
measures.
We can now state our general existence result for group games.
Theorem 7.4. Let G be an amenable, locally compact, metric group such that left-
invariant and right-invariant means coincide. Then the game G (P,G, u, ν) admits
Nash equilibria which do not depend on ν.
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The proof of Theorem 7.4 follows the line of the proof of Theorem 4.1, using
Theorems 7.2 and 7.3 and is therefore omitted.
The following general version of Paterson’s theorem guarantees that the class of
groups that satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 7.4 is large.
Theorem 7.5 (Paterson (1979)). An amenable, compactly generated6, locally compact
group G has the property that right-invariant and left-invariant means coincide if and
only if the closure of each conjugacy class is compact.
Wald’s game can also be played on R and all games in Subsection 6.3 can also
be played on [0, 1] mod 1. Theorem 7.4 guarantees existence of equilibria in this
uncountable setting. All results go through with the suitable needed modifications.
8 Conclusions
We have considered a class of games where the strategy set of each player is
a group and the payoff functions depend on the strategies only through the group
operation. We have shown that finitely additive equilibria exist for this class of games.
In the case of countable groups we have not used any topological conditions, just the
algebraic structure of the payoffs. The only measure theoretical assumption refers to
the selection of the product of finitely additive mixed strategies.
Even if the algebraic condition that we use leaves out a huge set of games, it
includes cases that are not covered by Marinacci (1997). In fact in general the payoff
functions that we considered are not measurable with respect to the algebra generated
by the cylinders. Indeed, his payoff functions satisfy Fubini’s theorem (Marinacci,
1997, Proposition 3), whereas ours in general do not. For instance take the two-
person zero-sum game on (Z,+) where u1(x, y) = 1N(x+ y). This function is clearly
not measurable with respect to the algebra generated by the cylinders, although it
is measurable with respect to the σ-algebra generated by the cylinders. Measurabil-
ity assumptions on the payoff functions are crucial to prove Marinacci’s theorems,
whereas we based our proofs on the algebraic properties of the payoffs.
As (Stinchcombe, 2005, Example 2.1) shows, the games that we considered in
general are not nearly compact and continuous as the ones in Harris et al. (2005).
Stinchcombe (2005) proves very general deep existence results, that are typically
non-constructive. In our paper we characterize the equilibrium strategies in a simple
form.
Capraro and Morrison (2012) prove that invariant means are minmax strategies
for zero-sum two-person games when the set of allowed strategies is restricted so that
6A topological group is called compactly generated if it is generated by a compact subset; namely,
there is a compact subset K of G such that every element g of G can be written in the form
g = k1 ∗ . . . ∗ kn, with ki ∈ K ∪K
−1. For instance, (R,+) is compactly generated by the interval
[−1, 1]: every real number r can be written in the form r = s+ . . .+ s, where s ∈ [−1, 1].
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the exchange of the order of integration is possible. In our paper we do not put any
restriction on the set of mixed strategies. Our results are not only more general, they
also requires different tools for their proof.
Candogan, Menache, Ozdaglar, and Parrilo (2011) show that any finite game can
be decomposed into three components, a potential, a nonstrategic, and a harmonic
component. The last component has the property that a profile of uniform strategies is
always an equilibrium. We notice that, even if group games share the same property,
they are neither a subclass nor a superclass of the class of harmonic games. For
instance, if φ1 = · · · = φN the group game is a potential game and therefore cannot
be harmonic. On the other hand in a harmonic game the strategy sets for the different
players are not necessarily the same.
We note that the class of group games is a subspace in the class of all games and
that the Candogan et al. (2011) decomposition holds in this subspace by projection.
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